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Abstract: This paper develops a model of an economy with clubs where
individuals may belong to multiple clubs and where there may be ever in-
creasing returns to club size. Clubs may be large, as large as the total agent
set. The main condition required is that suﬃcient wealth can compensate for
memberships in larger and larger clubs. Notions of price taking equilibrium
and the core, both with communication costs, are introduced. These notions
require that there is a small cost, called a communication cost, of deviating
from a given outcome. With some additional standard sorts of assumptions
1This paper originally appeared as University of Warwick Department of Economics
Working Paper # 639 (2002). This paper was presented at: the Athens General Equilib-
rium Conference, May 2002; PET 2002, June 2002; Social Choice and Welfare, July 2002;
ESEM August, 2002, and; the Illinois Economic Theory Workshop, April 2003. We thank
the participants and John Conley, Frank Page and Ben Zissimos for comments and for
references to the literature.
1on preferences, we demonstrate that, given communication costs parameter-
ized by ε > 0, for all suﬃciently large economies, the core is non-empty and
contains states of the economy that are in the core of the replicated econ-
omy for all replications (Edgeworth states of the economy). Moreover, for
any given economy, every state of the economy that is in the core for all
replications of that economy can be supported as a price-taking equilibrium
with communication costs. Together these two results imply that, given the
communication costs, for all suﬃciently large economies there exists Edge-
worth states of the economy and every Edgeworth state can be supported as
a price-taking equilibrium.
JEL Classiﬁcation Numbers: C 62, D 71, H 41.
21 Motivation
It seems compelling that gains to cooperation by large groups of individuals
may be substantial. For example, in economies with public goods, coordina-
tion of activities and decreasing costs of providing public goods may provide
increasing beneﬁts to ever larger club membership. Consider questions of
global pollution, global harmonization of productive activities and member-
ships in networks. If we wish a model to describe clubs such as the World
Trade Organization, the United Nations, the World Environmental Orga-
nization, or religions that wish to embrace all people, then a model with
bounded club sizes, where clubs become inﬁnitesimal in large economies is
not appropriate.2 Of course much economic activity is carried out within
small clubs — marriages, small ﬁrms, and swimming pool clubs for example.
It is also clear that a general model should also allow overlapping clubs so
that a participant may belong, for example, to a two-person partnership, a
dance club, and a world-wide social movement.
In this paper we explore the boundaries of price-taking equilibrium in
club economies where clubs may overlap and also may be large. Providing
most agents have many close substitutes, if an economy is suﬃciently large
then an equilibrium with communication costs and possibly some frictions,
captured by the presence of an exceptional set of agents, exists and is in the
core. Communication costs are parameterized by ε and ε can be allowed
to zero as the economy becomes large. Moreover, we demonstrate that in
large economies the core with communication costs is nonempty and that an
Edgeworth equilibrium exists. The set of Edgeworth equilibria is contained
in the set of equilibria with communication costs.
Allowing clubs to be as large as the entire agent set leads to a situation
that appears, in essence, to be fundamentally diﬀerent from a private goods
economy, or an economy where small groups of agents can exhaust all gains to
coalition formation or a pure public goods economy. Even in large economies,
discrimination between otherwise identical individuals can persist.
Recent literature suggests that whenever almost all gains to collective ac-
tivities can be realized by relatively small groups of participants then when
there are many participants diverse economies resemble markets. This in-
cludes economies with indivisibilities, nonconvexities, local public goods, and
2In fact, if the economy is essentially superadditive — that is, if an option open to a
large club is to divide into smaller clubs — then economies with possibly large clubs can
do no worse than those with clubs restricted in size.
3club economies with multiple memberships. In particular, under apparently
mild conditions — essentially just a mild superadditivity condition, bound-
edness of average or per capita payoﬀs, and many close substitutes for most
agents — approximate cores are nonempty, approximate cores treat similar
people similarly and economies, modeled as games with side payments, gen-
erate market games. In addition, analogous of the Laws of Demand and
Supply hold.3 Models of games with many agents, however, cannot treat the
properties of price-taking economic equilibrium, except for situations where
the ‘commodities’ to be priced are types of agents. To obtain richer results on
price-taking equilibrium, more detailed economic models are required. Our
primary focus is the extent to which increasing returns to club formation in
larger and larger economies is consistent with existence of price-taking equi-
librium and equivalence of the outcomes of price-taking equilibrium with
cooperative outcomes.
Our research grows out of the seminal works of Tiebout [1956] and Buchanan
[1965]. Tiebout conjectured that, in large economies with suﬃcient diversity
of communities in terms of their local public good oﬀerings, competitive
forces would lead to a ‘market-like outcome.’ Buchanan stressed that there
may be congestion so that optimal club sizes may exist; that is, there may
exist some ﬁnite population at which all gains to membership size would
be exhausted. There are now many models showing that large economies
with small optimal groups (communities, ﬁrms, clubs, jurisdictions, and so
on) generate markets; club membership is simply another commodity. For
example, think of movie theatres. Movies can be provided by clubs or by
proﬁt maximizing entrepreneurs. They tend to be provided by non-market
organizations when the demand is small — foreign ﬁlm clubs, for example —
and price discrimination of some sort may be required to cover costs. Most
models of such situations rule out large clubs that are few in number, for
example, the individual States in the United States. Requiring that optimal
clubs be small rules out much interesting economic activity, for example, the
formation or break up of nations.
Our paper is one of a few allowing the possibility of large clubs, perhaps as
large as the entire population, and the ﬁrst to study price-taking equilibrium
in contexts permitting both overlapping clubs and large clubs. Moreover, we
allow a compact metric space of player types so it does not necessarily hold
3We refer the reader to Wooders (1999) for a survey and to Kovalenkov and Wooders
(2003a) for more recent developments.
4that there are many exact substitutes for any player. Other than some stan-
dard conditions such as desirability of private goods, the main assumption of
o u rr e s e a r c hi st h a ts u ﬃcient wealth, measured in terms of private goods, can
compensate for ever larger club sizes. This permits ever-increasing returns to
club size while ruling out unbounded increasing returns. A simple example
is provided.
An interesting aspect of allowing unbounded club sizes is that, even
though we have an Edgeworth sort of equivalence result, our equilibrium
concept has personalized prices. Without assumptions further limiting gains
to club size and/or multiple memberships, we cannot relax the feature of
personalized prices and still obtain our results. Thus, we have a case that
is between the private goods case, with anonymous pricing and Edgeworth
equivalence, and the pure public good case, with personalized prices and
where Edgeworth equivalence does not in general hold.
In the following, Section 2 develops the model, Section 3 introduces games
induced by the economy, and states nonemptiness of the core with commu-
nication costs. Section 4 introduces the equilibrium concept. Our main
Theorems are stated in this section. With one exception, all Theorems are
proven in an Appendix. Section 5 relates our results to the literature and
Section 6 concludes the main body of the paper and the Appendix follows.
2 A club economy allowing large clubs
2.1 Agents
Let Ω be a compact set of attributes. An element of Ω,t y p i c a l l yd e n o t e db y
ω, is interpreted as a possible description of an agent. Let F(Ω)d e n o t et h e
set of all pairs (S,α)w h e r eS is a ﬁnite non-empty set and α : S −→ Ω is an
attribute function. In interpretation, S will be a set of agents and α(i), (i ∈ S)
describes all relevant characteristics of agent i, including a consumption set,
endowment, preferences, productive abilities, crowding attributes, and so
on. For ω ∈ Ω,t h es e to fa g e n t si nS with attributes ω is S ∩ α−1(ω)a n d
| S ∩ α−1(ω) | is their number. An economy is a pair (N,α) ∈ F(Ω)w h e r e
N = {1,...,n} is the set of agents and α : N −→ Ω is an attribute function.
52.2 Clubs and club structures
Let (N,α)b ea ne c o n o m y . W i t he a c hn o n e m p t ys u b s e to fN there is an
associated activity. We call such a subset a club and the activity, the club
activity. This club activity could be consumption of a local public good or
some shared activity, such as listening to music or swimming in the pool
belonging to the club. We note that a club and a coalition will have distinct
interpretations. A coalition is simply a nonempty subset of N while a club
is a nonempty subset associated with an activity. We will typically denote
ac l u bb ySk and a coalition by simply S.L e tS be a coalition and let {Sk}
denote a covering of S (with no repetitions) by clubs.4 S u c hac o v e r i n gi s
called a club structure of S. Let C(S) denote the set of club structures of S.
Note that an agent may belong to a number of clubs and thus participate
i nan u m b e ro fd i ﬀerent club activities. For example, an individual may be a
member of a marriage, a ﬁrm, and a dance club. Observe also that there are
no a priori restrictions on club size; for any economy (N,α) the total agent
set N may constitute a club.
For a club Sk, the production of the club activity requires zSk ∈− RL
+
inputs of private goods. For a purely ‘hedonic’ club — a club where the
membership of the club itself is the beneﬁto ft h ec l u b—w i t hn oc o s t so fc l u b
formation, the required inputs may be zero.
Given (N,α), S ⊂ N, a club structure S = {S1,...,S k,...,S K} ∈ C(S)
of S and i ∈ S,l e t
S[i]={Sk | Sk ∈ S and i ∈ Sk} (1)
denote the set of all proﬁles of clubs in S that contain consumer i.T h e
set S[i] describes the club memberships of agent i with respect to S.T h e
set C[i;S]=∪{S∈C(S)}S[i], where the union is taken over all club structures
C(S)o fS, is called the club consumption set relative to S for an agent i ∈ N.
4In principle, our techniques allow there to be two (or more) clubs with identical mem-
bership oﬀering diﬀerent activities — repetitions could be allowed. To introduce this
formally would signiﬁcantly increase notational complexity. Also, in principle, some par-
ticular clubs may be inadmissible — for example, three-person marriages may be ruled out,
at least legally. Inadmissible clubs can be accommodated within our current framework
by simply assigning negative utility to such clubs so that being a member of one would
not be individually rational.
62.3 Attributes
For each attribute ω ∈ Ω it is assumed that the description of an agent
provided by ω includes a positive endowment of each of a ﬁnite number L of
private goods (and that there are no endowments of club activities). Let eω
be the endowment of an agent with attribute ω of the private goods. For all




++. For an economy (N,α)a n d
i ∈ N with α(i)=ω,t h eendowment of i,d e n o t e db yei,e q u a l seω.
In any economy (N,α) the utility function of an agent i ∈ N with at-
tribute ω is denoted by uω(·,·) and maps Xω ×C [i;N]i n t oR,w h e r eXω,
called the commodities consumption set for an agent with attribute ω,i sa
given nonempty subset of RL
+ with eω in the interior of Xω.
I ti sa s s u m e dt h a t ,g i v e na n yS[i] ∈ C[i;S]w i t hα(i)=ω, the utility
function uω satisﬁes the usual properties of monotonicity, continuity and
convexity. Speciﬁcally, for any given i ∈ N satisfying α(i)=ω,f o ra n yg i v e n
club consumption S[i]f o ri, the utility function uω satisﬁes:
(a) Monotonicity: uω(·,S[i]) is an increasing function, that is, if x<x  
then uω(x,S[i]) <u ω(x ,S[i]) .
(b) Continuity: uω(·,S[i]) is a continuous function.
(c) Convexity: uω(·,S[i]) is a quasi-concave function.
(d) Desirability of endowment: There exists a real number τ > 0 with
the property that if uω(eω − τ1,{i}) ≤ ui(x ,S[i]), then x  > 0.5
(e) Boundedness: The marginal utility of agent i for the Lth private
good is bounded away from zero.
With the exception of (d), the conditions above are all standard. Con-
dition (d) incorporates the Hammond-Kaneko-Wooders (1989) and Kaneko-
Wooders (1989) condition that the endowment is preferred to any outcome
which assigns an agent zero of any of the indivisible (club) goods.6
5This assumption could be weakened but at the cost of more notation and without
signiﬁcant gain in economic understanding.
6In the literature of private goods exchange economies, related, more restrictive condi-
tions go back to Broome (1973). For economies with local public goods/clubs an analo-
gous condition was introduced in Wooders (1978,1980). The Hammond-Kaneko-Wooders
(1989) condition is less restrictive.
72.4 States of the economy and communication costs
Let (N,α)b ea ne c o n o m y ,l e tS be a nonempty subset of N, and let S be
a na d m i s s i b l ec l u bs t r u c t u r eo fS.Astate of the economy for S relative to
S is an ordered pair (xS,S), where xS =( xi : i ∈ S)i sa na l l o c a t i o nf o rS










Assume that if a group of agents is to form an alliance — a coalition — then
the agents must communicate with each other and possibly reallocate goods
among themselves. This motivates the introduction of a communication cost
required to form a coalition. Denote the communication cost for coalition S
by
c(ε,S)
def = ε|S|¯ z
where ¯ z ∈− RL








zSk + ε|S|¯ z.
2.5 The core with communication costs
The following concept of the core can be interpreted as either a notion of an
approximate core arising from market frictions or as an exact core relative to
communication costs, denoted by c(ε) and parameterized by ε.L e t( xN,N)
be a state of the economy relative to the club structure N. Ac o a l i t i o nS
can c(ε)-improve upon the state (xN,N) if there is a club structure S of S
and a c(ε,S)-feasible state of the economy (x S,S)f o r S such that for all






A feasible state of the economy (xN,N)i si nt h e c(ε)-core (of the econ-
omy) if it cannot be c(ε)-improved upon by any coalition S.
It is clear that when ε =0t h en o t i o no ft h ec(ε)-core coincides with the
standard notion of the core.
82.6 The communication core with remainders
Given the composition of a population N it may be that some subset of
agents cannot be accommodated in their preferred clubs. If this set relatively
small, then a solution concept ignoring an exceptional set of agents may
provide reasonable approximations to outcomes of an exact solution. Thus,
we weaken our notion of the c(ε)-core to take account of these observations.
An ε1-remainder c(ε0)-core state of the economy is a feasible state of
the economy (xN,N) satisfying the property that for some subset N0 ⊂ N
with
|N\N0|
|N| < ε1, (xN0,N 0)i sa nc(ε0)-core state of the economy as deﬁned
above. An ε1-remainder c(ε0)-core state of the economy simply ignores an
exceptional set of agents.
3 The game derived from an economy
G i v e na ne c o n o m y ,w ea s s o c i a t eap a r a meterized collection of games with
the economy, where the parameter depends on the communication costs. We
ﬁrst select a real number ε0 > 0s u ﬃciently small so that for every ε ∈ [0,ε0]
it holds that ε¯ z ≥− τ1.
Given an economy (N,α) ∈ F(Ω)a n dε ∈ [0,ε0]w ed e n o t et h eg a m e
induced by the economy by (N,V ε
α), where V ε
α is a correspondence mapping
subsets S of N into RN.F o r e a c h s u b s e t S of N, deﬁne V ε
α as the set
of vectors v ∈ RN with the property that for some club structure S of S
and some c(ε,S)-feasible state with associated allocation (xS,S)w eh a v e
vi ≤ ui(xi,S[i]) for each i ∈ S.W h e nε =0 ,w ed e n o t eV ε
α simply by Vα.
We will assume throughout that the following notion of continuity on
F(Ω)h o l d s . 7
Mean continuity:G i v e na n yε ∈ [0,ε0], for every ρ > 0t h e r ee x i s t sar e a l
number θ > 0 such that if (N,α),(N,β) ∈ F(Ω)a n dd(α(i),β(i)) < θ
for all i ∈ N,t h e nH(V ε
α(N),Vε
β(N)) < ρ,w h e r eH is the Hausdorﬀ
distance.
7This assumption could be obtained as a consequence of continuity assumptions on
attributes. Agents whose attributes are ‘close’ are intended to be approximate substi-
tutes — that is, in the metric on attribute space, their utility functions, crowding types,
endowments and so on are close and they are perceived as similar by other agents. It is
worth noticing that if Ω is a ﬁnite set, we have a ﬁnite number of types of agents and this
assumption is satisﬁed automatically.
93.1 Replica games
Our central results depend on extending the replication case (with a ﬁxed
distribution of agents on attribute space) to the case of a compact metric
space of attributes. Since one of our main assumptions, ensuring ‘per capita
boundedness’ of payoﬀ sets of derived games, is required only for replication
sequences, we now turn to this case.
Given (N,α) ∈ F(Ω), for each positive integer r we deﬁne the rth replica
economy, denoted by (Nr,rα) ∈ F(Ω) as the economy with agent set
Nr = {(i,q):i =1 ,...,N and q =1 ,...,r},
and attribute function rα : Nr −→ Ω where rα(i,q)=α(i),q=1 ,...,r
(i.e all agents (i,q), (i,q ), are identical in terms of attributes). The agent
(i,q) is called the qth agent of type i. To replicate a state of the economy, in
addition to replicating the consumer set we also replicate the club structure
and consumptions so that all replicas of an individual consumer are in clubs
with identical proﬁles, and are allocated identical consumptions.
Let N = {J1,...,Jg,...,JG} be a club structure of N and let r be a positive
integer. Let Nr be a club structure of Nr containing rG clubs and denoted
by:
Nr = {Jgj : j =1 ,...,r and g =1 ,...,G},
where for each j =1 ,...,r and each g =1 ,...,Gthe proﬁle of Jgj equals the
proﬁle of Jg.T h e nNr is the rth replication of N.
Let (x,N) be a state of the economy (N,α). A state of the replicated
economy (Nr,rα), denoted by (xNr,Nr), is an rth replication of (x,N)i f
(a) for each g =1 ,...,G and each j =1 ,...,r,
zJgj = zJg;
(b) for each consumer i ∈ N there are r consumers (i,q)w h e r eq =1 ,...,r,
in the replicated agent set Nr who are allocated the same private goods
bundle as i.
A state of the economy (xN,N)i si nt h e c(ε)-core for all replications if,
for each positive integer r, it holds that an rth replication of (x,N)i si nt h e
c(ε)-core of the rth replication of the economy.
We will also require some minimal assumption on the economy to en-
sure that equal-treatment utilities derived from the economy do not become
inﬁnite. To this purpose we introduce the following assumption:
10Desirability of wealth: Assume that there is a bundle of private goods, x∗
and a replication number r∗, such that for some club structure Nr∗ of







for any xi and any club structure Nr of the rth economy.
Informally, this assumption ensures that wealth, in terms of private goods,
can substitute for ‘large’ clubs, no matter how large the economy. Because
of the possibility of ever-increasing returns to club size, due to public goods
for example, in our model agents may derive more and more utility from
larger and larger clubs. Informally, desirability of wealth dictates that if an
individual were suﬃciently wealthy, however, he could provide club goods for
himself and just a few friends (no more than r∗ of each type that appears in
the economy) and achieve a preferred outcome. Note that x∗ is independent
of the type of the agent; this is for simplicity of statement. Also, note
that x∗ may not be feasible for the r∗th economy. Desirability of wealth is
considerably weaker than bounding club sizes.
Example 1. As a simple example, suppose individuals derive utility only
from money and from sharing some common activity with other individuals.





where m is the size of the club to which he belongs and ξ is money. Possible
values for r∗ and x∗, in the deﬁnition of desirability of wealth, are r∗ =1 0










We highlight that desirability of wealth is satisﬁed and the feasible per capita
utility level as a function of the economy size does not achieve a maximum —
desirability of wealth does not imply the existence of an optimal club size.
113.2 Nonemptiness of communication cost cores with
remainders
Our ﬁrst Theorem, showing nonemptiness of communication cost cores with
remainders, is central. To demonstrate existence of equilibrium we will then
demonstrate the existence of prices supporting states of the economy in an
‘Edgeworth core’.
Theorem 1. Assume desirability of wealth. Then, given any ε1,ε0 > 0t h e r e
is an integer n(ε1,ε0) such that: if N is a set of agents with |N| >n (ε1,ε0)
then for any attribute function α : N → Ω,t h eε1-remainder c(ε0)-core of
(N,α)i sn o n e m p t y .
Indeed, we prove more. First, let us deﬁne an (ε1,ε0)Edgeworth state
of the economy (N,α) as a state of the economy with the property that the
state is in the ε1-remainder c(ε0)-core and, for all replications (Nr,rα)o ft h a t
state, there is a subset of agents N0
r ⊂ Nr such that no coalition S ⊂ N0
r can





e < ε1 |N|




e e < ε1 |Nr|.
Less formally, for any economy (N,α)w i t hs u ﬃciently many agents an
(ε1,ε0)Edgeworth state of the economy (N,α)i si na na p p r o x i m a t ec o r e( t h e
ε1-remainder c(ε0)-core) for all replications of the economy.
Theorem 2. Assume desirability of wealth. Then, given any ε1,ε0 > 0t h e r e
is an n(ε1,ε0)s u c ht h a t :f o ra n ys e to fa g e n t sN, if |N| >n (ε1,ε0)t h e nf o r
any attribute function α : N → Ω there exists an (ε1,ε0)Edgeworth state of
the economy (N,α).
Note that neither of the above Theorems depend on replication.
124 Equilibrium with communication costs
In this section we ﬁrst deﬁne a communication cost equilibrium, called the
c(ε0)-equilibrium, and then state our existence and ‘Edgeworth equivalence’
results.
A price system for private goods is a vector p ∈ RL
+.Aparticipation price
system is a set
Π = {π
i(Sk) ∈ R : Sk ⊂ N and i ∈ Sk},
stating a participation price, positive, negative, or zero, for each agent in
each club Sk.
A c(ε0)-equilibrium (for an economy with club goods) is an ordered triple
((xN,N),p,Π)c o n s i s t i n go fas t a t eo ft h ee c o n o m y( xN,N), where N =
{J1,...,Jg,...,JG}, a price system p ∈ RL
+ \{ 0} for private goods, and a
participation price system Π, such that:
(i)





(ii) for each possible club Sk ⊂ N,





( n oc l u bm a k e sap o s i t i v ep r o ﬁt);
(iii) for any agent i ∈ N, any S ⊂ N with i ∈ S, and any club structure













i + εp · ¯ z













εp · ¯ z, and
8Since any club structure S of S c a nb ee m b e d d e di nac l u bs t r u c t u r eo fN, say N,
so that S[i]=N[i], this condition could also be stated in terms of club structures of the














i + εp · ¯ z).
(agents cannot be signiﬁcantly far, in aggregate, inside their budget sets and
similarly for clubs).
Our notion of c(ε0)-equilibrium allows at least some agents to spend less
than their entire income at the given prices. This is because of the com-
munication costs, which aﬀect not only the opportunities to change club
memberships but also opportunities to purchase diﬀerence commodity bun-
dles.
An ε1-remainder c(ε0)-equilibrium is an ordered triple ((xN,N),p,Π)
such that for some subset of agents N0 ⊂ N satisfying
|N\N0|
|N| < ε1 there
exists a c(ε0)-equilibrium ((xN0
,N 0),p,Π)a sd e ﬁned above.
Our notion of ε1-remainder c(ε0)-equilibrium dictates that all agents in
the economy are ‘competitive’ or almost competitive except perhaps small
proportions of ‘left over’ agents. Concepts of approximate equilibrium or
cores involving left over agents are common in the literature of game theory
and economics. The left-overs may have unsatisﬁed demands. Such situations
may arise from imperfections in markets.
In Theorem 3 we demonstrate that an ε1-remainder c(ε0)-equilibrium
state of the economy is in the ε1-remainder c(ε0)-core.
Theorem 3:L e t( N,α)b ea ne c o n o m y .A nε1-remainder c(ε0)-equilibrium
state of the economy is in the ε1-remainder c(ε0)-core.
Proof: Suppose the Theorem is false. Then there exists at least one ε1-
remainder c(ε0)-equilibrium (otherwise the result would be vacuously true).
Let ((xN0,N 0),p,Π)bea nε1-remainder c(ε0)-equilibrium with the properties
that
|N\N0|
|N| < ε1 and the state of the economy (xN0,N0)i sn o ti nt h eε1-
remainder c(ε0)-core. This means that there is a coalition S ⊂ N0
r,ac l u b

















14From (ii) of the deﬁnition of an c(ε0)-equilibrium it holds that












i + εp · ¯ z.








p · zSk + p · ε|S|¯ z,
which is a contradiction.
Theorem 4. Assume desirability of wealth. Let (N,α) be an economy.
Then, given any ε1,ε0 > 0 there is an integer n(ε1,ε0)s u c ht h a t :i f|N| >
n(ε1,ε0) then there exists an (ε1,ε0)-Edgeworth state of the economy. More-
over, any (ε1,ε0)-Edgeworth state of the economy is an ε1-remainder c(ε0)-
equilibrium for the economy (N,α).
We highlight that: Theorem 3 states that an ε1-remainder c(ε0)-equilibrium
is in the ε1-remainder c(ε0)-core; Theorem 4 states that an Edgeworth state
of the economy (a state of the economy with the property that all replications
of that state are in the ε1-remainder c(ε0)-core of the replicated economy)
exists and any Edgeworth state of the economy is an equilibrium. Note that,
unlike the case of a private goods economy as in Debreu and Scarf (1963) and
many other papers, because new clubs arise when the numbers of agents in
the economy increases, an equilibrium for a larger economy requires a larger
set of admission prices.9
9In the economy with agent set N the only ‘club commodities’ that exist are given by
subsets of N. Thus, it suﬃces to have prices only for admission to these clubs.
155 Relationships to the literature
5.1 The seminal works of Tiebout (1956) and Buchanan
(1965)
In his seminal paper, Tiebout (1956) observed that if public goods are local
rather than pure and it is optimal or near optimal to have many jurisdictions
providing public goods, then the movement of consumers to their preferred
jurisdictions will lead to a ‘market-type,’ near-optimal outcome and the free
rider problem of economies with pure public goods will not arise, the ‘Tiebout
Hypothesis.’ While the general ideas of Tiebout’s paper were quite informally
expressed — there were no precise deﬁnitions or conjectures — he did describe
a ‘severe’ model that could easily be formalized. In his severe model (page
441 of the journal), Tiebout supposes that there exists an inﬁnite number
of communities, each oﬀering a diﬀerent public goods package (implicitly, so
that all possible levels of public goods are provided). There is no congestion
nor any increasing returns to scale within jurisdictions and per capita costs
of providing the public goods on oﬀer within a community are constant, in-
dependent of the number of members of a community. In such a situation,
the consumer-voter can move to the community where his demands for pub-
lic goods are exactly satisﬁed. Tiebout himself, as he makes clear, did not
view this severe model as a good approximation to reality — for one thing,
for the exact satisfaction of consumer demands, the number of (nonempty)
communities may well need to be equal to the number of types of consumers
— but the model was intended to illustrate how his informally described ideas
may work.
Example 2. An example may help make Tiebout’s severe model clearer.
Suppose all levels of public goods are possible. Thus, let us suppose that
community x ∈ R+ oﬀers quantity (or quality) x of the public good. Suppose
that the costs of providing x to n consumers is $xn a n dt h a tc o n s u m e rw h o
chooses community x must pay the cost (or tax) x. Each consumer i ∈ N




Also assume fi(x) is concave. Then consumer i faces the problem:
maximizex f
i(x)+ξ − x.
16Since fi(x) − x is concave, a maximum exists and, with free mobility, the
utility maximizing consumer may move to exactly that community which
maximizes his preferences (subject to his budget constraint).
Note that in this simple example the size of the population is of no real
relevance. It could be ﬁnite or (with the technical measure-theoretic condi-
tions) a continuum (with or without atoms — no real problem either way).
In fact, Bewley (1981) provides a formulation of Tiebout’s severe model
but with the condition of free entry replacing the assumption of an inﬁ-
nite number of communities all providing diﬀerent public goods packages.10
The free entry condition is that, given prices for private goods, no subset
of consumers could provide a preferred level of public goods for themselves.
Bewley reaches the same conclusion as Tiebout does for his severe model.
Unless there are as many communities as types of consumers, an equilibrium
may not exist. Moreover, as Tiebout, Bewley concludes that this severe
model does not make much sense.11
We now leave Tiebout aside for the moment and turn to Buchanan (1965),
which highlighted the fact that (local) public goods may become congested
and there may be optimal, ﬁnite club (community, or jurisdiction) sizes. Un-
like Tiebout, Buchanan did not appear to have in mind economies with many
participants but instead considered ﬁrst order conditions to characterize op-
timal club size. But note that there is really not much diﬀerence between
a Buchanan club and a Tiebout jurisdiction, at least at this point in the
development of the literature.
5.2 Decentralizing core outc o m e sa sp r i c et a k i n ge q u i -
librium
The analysis of economies with clubs via cooperative game theory appears
to have been initiated by Pauly, cf., his 1972 paper. There Pauly considered
a model with essentially identical cons u m e r sa n da no p t i m a lc l u bs i z e .P a u l y
10The free entry condition also appears in Pauly (1972), Wooders (1978) and other more
recent papers.
11Unlike Tiebout, however, Bewley did not apparently appreciate the importance of a
large population and a potentially large number of jurisdictions. Bewley collects a number
of examples from the literature demonstrating problems in deﬁning an appropriate notion
of equilibrium yielding both existence and optimality but none of these examples treat the
possibility of a large number of jurisdictions.
17argued that unless the total payer set could be partitioned into clubs of
optimal sizes, the core would be empty. Wooders (1978,1980) allows several
types of agents and nondiﬀerentiated (or anonymous) crowding.12 In Conley
and Wooders (1996,1997), and Cole and Prescott (1997) the model is further
developed in that the crowding types of agents (external characteristics) are
separated from taste types and it is shown that ﬁrst best prices can be deﬁned
to depend only on the crowding types of agents; no private information is
required.13 A short survey of the vast literature is provided in Wooders
(1999).
I nt h ee c o n o m i cm o d e l so ft h o s ep a p e r sl i s t e da b o v ee a c ha g e n tm a yb e -
long to only one jurisdiction. Allowing multiple memberships in clubs, Shu-
bik and Wooders (1982) demonstrated nonemptiness of approximate cores of
economies with many agents but price-taking equilibrium was not studied.
Kovalenkov and Wooders (2003a) demonstrated conditions under which large
ﬁnite games and economies with clubs and permitting multiple memberships
have nonempty approximate cores. Subsequently, Ellickson et al (2001) in-
troduced a model of an economy with multiple memberships and obtained
approximate versions of existence of equilibrium and equivalence of the core
and the set of equilibrium outcomes. Their model is more restrictive than the
prior model of Shubik and Wooders (1982) and Kovalenkov and Wooders in
the sense that Ellickson et al allow only a bounded number of distinct sorts
of clubs; thus clubs become negligible as the economy grows large. Following
Conley and Wooders (1996,1997) and Cole and Prescott (1997), Ellickson
et al. make a distinction between the crowding types (in their language,
‘external characteristics’) of agents and their taste (and endowment) types.
Our approach in this paper is in part based on earlier research, especially
Wooders (1983), showing that under apparently mild restrictions — bound-
edness of per capita payoﬀs in utility space — approximate cores of growing
12In Pauly (1972), the two types of agents may appear to diﬀer but, as shown in Wooders
(1976), the fact that both types of agents make the identical marginal contributions to
coalitions implies that only the size and not the composition of coalitions is relevant.
13When crowding is anonymous — that is, individuals care only about the numbers of
agents in the same jurisdiction and not their characteristics — then prices are anonymous
(Wooders 1978). With diﬀerentiated (also known as nonanonymous) crowding, until the
works of Conley and Wooders (1996,1997) and Cole and Prescott (1997), prices were also
nonanonymous, depending on tastes. Conley and Wooders (1996,1997) and Cole and
Prescott (1997) separated taste types from crowding types and showed that ﬁrst best
prices can be deﬁned to depend only on crowding types or external characteristics of
agents.
18games with a ﬁxed distribution of agent types are nonempty and on Shubik
and Wooders (1982) who introduce the study of the core in economies with
clubs and multiple memberships.14 A crucial innovation in the current pa-
per is our construction of the commodity space. Part of this innovation is
in extending and further developing the Foley (1970)-Wooders (1985) proof
technique of deﬁning ‘preferred sets of allocations of private goods’ for coali-
tions. To ensure that the games derived from the economies satisfy per capita
boundedness — simply boundedness of the set of equal treatment payoﬀs—w e
make an assumption of ‘desirability of wealth’. Informally, this assumption
dictates that there is some level of wealth, measured in terms of a bundle
of private goods, such that an individual would prefer that level of wealth
and membership in some bounded number of clubs, all bounded in size, to
any feasible equal-treatment outcome in any economy, no matter how large.
Loosely, desirability of wealth implies that private goods can compensate for
membership in large clubs.
In the literature on approximate cores of games and economies with col-
lective activities and clubs, there are a number of models in the literature per-
mitting ever-increasing gains to coalition and club sizes (Wooders 1983,1994
and Kovalenkov and Wooders 2001a,b, 2003a,b). These models permit games
derived from economies where individuals may belong to overlapping clubs
and where there may be ever-increasing gains to club size. In addition, follow-
ing Shubik and Wooders (1982), Kovalenkov and Wooders (2003a) explicitly
allow an individual to belong to multiple clubs. There have also been a num-
ber of papers demonstrating that states of the economy in approximate cores
of economies with clubs can be supported as price-taking equilibrium out-
comes.15 None of these papers studying price-taking equilibrium, however,
allow equilibrium clubs to be large and individuals to belong to overlapping
clubs. Indeed, except for sequences of economies with a ﬁxed distribution of
agent types, none of these papers allow large clubs. In contrast, we allow all
agents to diﬀer in their crowding types; the set of player types is a compact
metric space.
In view of the prior literature on large games and large economies one
might hope for approximate equivalence in large ﬁnite economies even with
14Note that in Wooders (1983), the set of players is replicated but the payoﬀ set to any
coalition of players may increase as the size of the total population increases.
15See, for example, Conley and Wooders (1997,2001), Ellickson et al. (2002), and Wood-
ers (1989,1996). Except for some results in the last two papers, all these papers bound
club sizes.
19multiple memberships in clubs and with potentially ever-increasing returns
to club size. The crucial restriction appears to be that almost all gains to col-
lective activities are realized by groups bounded in size; that is, small groups
are eﬀective. In the case of one-private-good, the restrictions of Ellickson et
al. transform the economy into an essentially private goods economy with
indivisibilities and a consistency condition on club memberships that yield an
appropriate feasibility condition. Our research demonstrates an asymptotic
equivalence when arbitrarily large clubs and ever increasing returns to club
size are allowed.
To place our model and proof techniques in the literature, our research
builds on the research of Debreu and Scarf (1963), Foley (1970) and Wooders
(1985). Recall that, given a state of the economy that is in the core for all
replications of the total agent set, Debreu and Scarf (1963) deﬁne the set of
preferred net trades of each agent in the economy and show that the convex
hull of union of these sets can be separated from the origin. For an economy
with pure public goods, Foley (1970) extends the commodity space to make
the public good a separate good for each consumer. Wooders (1985) further
extends the commodity space to make local public goods for each consumer
in each possible jurisdiction separate commodities. In this paper, we build
on these three approaches. Precisely, we extend the public good space so
that each club and its membership is a diﬀerent commodity for each agent in
the club. Having done so, extensions of the techniques of Debreu and Scarf
(1963) can be applied. We also introduce a virtual production set. Even
though we have no production in the current paper, our virtual production
set plays a similar role to the extended production sets in Foley (1970) and
Wooders (1985). In particular, the feasibility requirements ensuring the club
choices are consistent are imposed on the virtual production set.
6 Conclusions
The major economic importance of our research is that equilibrium clubs may
be unbounded — they do not necessarily become inﬁnitesimal as the economy
grows large. This aspect of our modeling is especially relevant for questions
of political economy, for example, and to issues of regulation of large ﬁrms,
such as multinationals. We hope to study these issues, as well as other issues
relating to labor markets in economies with large ﬁrms/jurisdictions in future
research.
207 Appendix
Now, we state and prove our ﬁrst result.
Theorem 2. Assume desirability of wealth. Then, given any ε1,ε0 > 0t h e r e
is an n(ε1,ε0)s u c ht h a t :f o ra n ys e to fa g e n t sN, if |N| >n (ε1,ε0)t h e nf o r
any attribute function α : N → Ω there exists an (ε1,ε0)Edgeworth state of
the economy (N,α).
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m2 . The proof is divided into two steps.
STEP 1.
Suppose the claim of the Theorem is not true. Then there exists ε1,ε0 > 0
and a sequence of economies (Nν,αν)∞
ν=1 such that for every ν we have |Nν| >
ν and the ε1-remainder c(ε0)-core of (Nν,αν) is empty. From Assumption
(e), boundedness of marginal utilities with respect to at least one commodity,
there is a positive number ρ > 0 such that for every club structure N, for
each agent i ∈ N and every consumption xi ∈ Xi we obtain
u
i(x
i − ε0¯ z,N[i]) ≥ u
i(x
i,N[i]) + ρ.
From the mean continuity assumption, there exists θ such that for all









Let Ω1,...,ΩT be a partition of Ω such that if ω,ω  ∈ Ωi then d(ω,ω ) < θ.
For each i =1 ,...,T select arbitrarily ωi ∈ Ωi.F o r e a c h ( Nν,αν)d e ﬁne
another pair (Nν,γν) where the attribute function γν is deﬁned by γν(i)=ωi
whenever αν(i) ∈ Ωi. W en o t i c et h a tt h er a n g eo fa l lt h eγν is ﬁnite and
therefore one may represent this sequence of economies as
Nν = {(i,q):i =1 ,...,T and q =1 ,...,n
ν
i}
where all agents (i,q)a n d( i ,q  )w h e r ei = i  are substitutes for each other
— that is, they have the same attributes.
The following Lemma is used to approximate the sequence of economies
(Nν,γν) by a sequence of replication economies.
21Lemma 1 (Wooders, 1992 Lemma 1). Let {Nν} be a sequence of sets of
agents where
Nν = {(i,q):i =1 ,...,T and q =1 ,...,n
ν
i}
for some integers nν




converges to a limit ni,
where Nν
i
def = {(i,q):q =1 ,...,nν
i}, the subset of agents in Nν of type i.
Then, given ε1 > 0 there exists a vector of integers, n =( n1,...,nT),s u c h








νn +  
ν
and
  ν 
 nν 
< ε1
where, for any vector n, n 
def = Σ
t nt. (Observe that |Nν| =  nν .)
Now let us consider an economy N with proﬁle n. We will need the
following deﬁnition and Lemma for replication sequences Nr of N.
A state of the economy (xN,N)s a t i s ﬁes the equal treatment property in






 ]) = u
i(x
i,N[i]).
We call (xN,N)autility equal treatment feasible state of the economy.
Lemma 2 Assume desirability of wealth. Then there is a positive real num-
ber K such that for any replication number r and for any utility equal treat-
ment feasible state of the rih economy,
supu
i(x
i,N r[i]) <K .
(per capita boundedness).
22Proof. First, deﬁne (Nr,Vε
r ) as the game induced by the rth replication of the
economy with agent set N. To show per-capita boundedness of (Nr,Vε
r )∞
r=1
we construct a sequence of *-economies and consider the sequence of games,
denoted by (Nr,V∗
r )∞
r=1, derived from the sequences of *-economies. To ob-
tain the conclusion of the Lemma we construct the sequence of *-economies
so that V ε
r (Nr) ⊂ V ∗




For the *-economy, let the utility function of agent i be deﬁned by
u
∗i(x




where r∗ satisﬁes desirability of wealth.
The utility functions u∗i are well deﬁned and are quasi-concave. Also. it












The set of all *-feasible allocations is denoted by A∗






From the closeness of A∗
1 and quasi concavity there is a such real number.
Obviously, since V ε
r (Nr) ⊂ V ∗
r (Nr), K is a per-capita bound for the original
sequence of games .¤
To proceed, we introduce another notion of an approximate core, the
s(ρ)-core for the game (N,Vε), b a s e do ns a t i s ﬁcing behavior rather than on
communication costs. A payoﬀ v ∈ V ε(N)i si nt h es(ρ)-core of (N,Vε)i f
for all non-empty subsets S of N we have v + ¯ 1ρ / ∈ intV ε(S).




r ) for all suﬃciently large r.
Proof of Lemma 3. This follows from per-capita boundedness and Theorem
2 in Wooders (1983). The convexity assumption of Vr(Nr) is replaced by the
23overriding desirability of the private goods as in Wooders (1988) (Assumption
(e) here).
STEP 2.
Now let us consider the sequence of economies (Nrν,αrν
)w h e r eαrν
is the
restriction of αν to Nrν. We claim that there exist a ν∗ a n da na l l o c a t i o n
in (Nrν∗,αrν∗
)t h a ti si nt h ec(ε0)-core of all the replications. The proof is
divided into several Lemmas.
Lemma 4 There exists β ∈ RN such that for some positive integer ν∗ we
have βrν∗ is in the s(ρ)-core of all the replications of (Nrν∗,αrν∗
).
Proof of Lemma 4. First, from Lemma 3, one can choose ν∗ such that vrν∗,
the rrh replica of v, is in the s(
ρ
3)−core of (Nrν∗,Vε
rν∗) for all replications. It





3¯ 1. Thus, by taking βrν∗ = vrν∗ −
ρ
3¯ 1o n eo b t a i n sβrν∗ ∈
V ε





3¯ 1, for all S ⊂ Nrν∗. By Lemma 3 one has vrν∗ +
ρ
3¯ 1 / ∈ intV  
rν∗(S).
Rearranging terms, one obtains βrν∗ + ρ = vrν∗ +
2ρ
3 ¯ 1 / ∈ intV  
αrν∗(S). This
ends the proof.
Lemma 5 There exists ν∗ and a state of the economy for (Nrν∗,αrν∗
) in the
c(ε0)-core for all replications.
It follows from Lemma 4 that there exists ν∗ such that βrν∗ is in the s(ρ)-
core for all replications of (Nrν∗,αrν∗
). Therefore it follows that βrν∗ + ρ ∈
V ε
αrν∗(Nrν∗)+ρ1 ⊂ V
αrν∗(Nrν∗). Now let us consider a feasible allocation
(xNrν∗,Nrν∗) such that ui(xi,Nrν∗[i]) ≥ βi + ρ. Clearly, (xNrν∗,Nrν∗)i si n
the c(ε0)-core of any replication of the economy since βrν∗ + ρ1 / ∈ intV ε
nαrν∗
for any S ⊂ Nrν∗ and any replication number n.T h i si sac o n t r a d i c t i o n .
Theorem 4. Assume desirability of wealth. Let (N,α) be an economy.
Then, given any ε1,ε0 > 0 there is an integer n(ε1,ε0)s u c ht h a t :i f|N| >
n(ε1,ε0) then there exists an (ε1,ε0)-Edgeworth state of the economy. More-
over, any (ε1,ε0)-Edgeworth state of the economy is an ε1-remainder c(ε0)-
equilibrium for the economy (N,α)
24P r o o fo fT h e o r e m4
The proof of the Theorem is an extension of proofs of convergence of
the core to equilibrium states due to Debreu and Scarf (1963) and existence
proof of Foley (1970) and Wooders (1989). From Theorem 2 there exists an
economy suﬃciently large, say (N,α) and an allocation (xN,N)i nt h e 1-
remainder c( 0)-core of the economy for all replications of the economy, then
(xN,N)i sa n 1-remainder c( 0)-equilibrium state of the economy. With-
out any loss of generality we can assume that there exists N0 such that
|N\N0|
|N| <  1 and (xN0
,N 0)i nt h ec( 0)-core of the economy for all replica-
tions of the economy . Then (xN0
,N 0)i sa nc( 0)-equilibrium state of the
economy. Let {S1,...,Sk,...,SK} denote the set of all clubs in N0 and let
N 0 = {J1,...,Jg,...,JG}.
Preliminaries:W eﬁrst consider the following space A = RN0K where N0
is the number of agents and K is the number of all possible clubs in N0.L e t




and for each k, ai
k ∈R.L e tAi be the set of elements in RK deﬁned by
Ai = {a ∈ R
N0K : a
i 
k =0i fi  = i
 or if i/ ∈ Sk}.
For a given S[i] ∈ S[i], we represent S[i]i nAi by a, such that ai
k equals
one if Sk belongs to S[i] and equals zero otherwise.
We next deﬁne a ‘virtual’ production set in the extended commodity
space. For each k deﬁne b[k] ∈ RN0K as a vector having the properties that:
(i) b[k]i
k  =0i fk  = k  or if i/ ∈ Sk
(ii) for (any) i in Sk, b[k]i
k =1
Deﬁne the virtual production set Y as the convex cone generated by the
{(zSk,b[k]) : k =1 ,...,K},w h e r ezSk is the input required to form the
club zSk.T h es e tY is precisely the set of all positive linear combinations of
{(zSk,b[k]) : k =1 ,...,K}.
Step 1: The sets of preferred allocations Ωi.L e tΩi denote the set of
members of (xi − ei − ε¯ z,ai)i nXi × Ai such that, for every club structure
S with the property that S[i]={Sk | ai
k =1 },w eh a v eui(xi,S[i]) >
ui(˜ xi,N[i]).
The set Ωi ⊂RL+N0K describes the set of net trades of private goods and
club memberships for agent i strictly preferred to his allocation in the given
state of the economy (˜ xN0,N 0). It is clear that Ωi is not convex.
25Step 2: The preferred set Ω. Let Ω denote the convex hull of the union
of the sets Ωi, i =1 ,...,N0. We now show, in the remainder of Step 2, that
Ω ∩ Y = ∅.
Suppose, on the contrary, that (x,a) ∈ Ω ∩ Y . Then, by the deﬁnition
of Ω there exist an integer J and λ ∈ RJ such that (x,a)=
J
j=1 λj(xj,a j)
with λj > 0,

λj =1 .






















For a given (xj,a j)i nΩi and a given sequence {(βn)}n of real numbers.
Suppose that βn ≥ 1f o re a c hn and that (βnxj,a j) converges to one as n
goes to inﬁnity. Then, because of the continuity of preferences, for all n
suﬃciently large, we have (βnxj,a j)i si nΩi.
We now show that, since we have supposed that Ω∩Y  = ∅,w ec a nf o r m
a blocking coalition for some suﬃciently large replication. We will use the
following lemma.




converging to (λ1,...,λj,...,λJ) and having the properties that:
(i) λn
j ≤ λj















Proof. Let us consider the closed line segment [0RJ,λ]i nRJ.F r o mc o n v e x i t y











But we know that QJ, where Q is the set of rational number, is dense in
RJ. Hence, QJ ∩ [0RJ,λ] is dense in [0RJ,λ] and therefore we can choose a
sequence satisfying (i) and (ii).¤
L e tu sc o n s i d e rt h es e q u e n c e( λn
1,...,λn
j,...,λn
J)d e ﬁned above, and let
us select a positive integer n, which will eventually tend to inﬁnity. For each
j deﬁne xjn =
λj
λn
j xj. From the concluding paragraph of the last Step, for all
n suﬃciently large it holds that (xjn,a j) ∈ Ωi.L e t n satisfy the property
that (xjn,a j) ∈ Ωi for each i. Recall that λn
j is a rational number.












k ≤ µk and zk ∈− RL












Let r  be a replication number such that r λn
j is an integer for all j.L e t
δj = r λn
j and γk =









Let r∗ be an integer suﬃciently large so that there are γk copies of the
club Sk,f o re a c hk, contained in the set r∗th replication N0
r∗ of N0 and so
that this does not hold for any r<r ∗, that is, r∗ is minimal. This implies
that there is a state of the economy for the coalition S that can c( 0)-improve
upon the initially given state of the economy. The state of the economy for S
described by the consumption plans (xjn,a j), for δj consumers, for each j is
c( 0)-feasible and preferred by all members of the replication of the initially
given state of the economy. Consequently, S can c( 0)- improve upon the
r∗th replication of (˜ xN0,N 0), which is a contradiction. Therefore Ω∩Y = ∅.
Step 3: Prices. From the Minkowski Separating Hyperplane Theorem,
there is a hyperplane with normal (p,π)  =0 ,w h e r ep is in the private goods
price space, and π ∈ RN0K such that, for some constant C,
27p · x + π · a ≥ C for all (x,a) ∈ Ω and
p · z + π · b ≤ C for all (z,b) ∈ Y.
Since Y is a closed convex cone with vertex zero, it follows that we can choose
C = 0. Then, in particular, it follows that for each (xi,a i) ∈ Ωi
p · (x
i − e






and for each club Sk ⊂ N we have





Recall that (˜ xN0,N 0)i sac( )-core state of the economy relative to the
club structure N 0 = {J1,...,J G} of N0. Observe that we can represent the
total consumption of each agent i by (˜ xi,˜ ai) ∈ RL+N0K.
From monotonicity it follows that p ≥ 0. Suppose that p = 0. Therefore,





and for each i ∈ Sk we have πi(Sk) ≥ 0. Thus πi(Sk) = 0, for each Sk and
each i ∈ Sk, which is a contradiction to the fact that (p,π)  =0 .
Since, for each i,( ˜ xi − ei −  ¯ z,˜ ai)i si nt h ec l o s u r eo fΩi,i th o l d st h a t
p · (˜ x
i − e






Moreover, for each club Jg we have















28and summing over clubs one obtains
3
g







Since p ∈ RL
+ \{ 0} and

i∈N(˜ xi − ei) ≤











Then from the fact that p · zJg +
































Now we claim that ((˜ xN0
,N 0),p,Π)i sac( )-equilibrium. Checking the
proof so far, it remains only to show that individual consumers are optimiz-
ing, i.e., that the prices p, Π and the state (xN0,N 0) satisfy condition (iii)
of the deﬁnition of an equilibrium.




































 i − e






29which is a contradiction.
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